Popular Sovereignty and Constitutional Conventions

Authors

  • Roberto Gargarella Universidad de Buenos Aires (Argentina)

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.61243/calamo.3.297

Keywords:

Constitutional Conventions, Pluralism, Sovereignty, Democracy, Reform

Abstract

This article provides an insight about the constitutional conventions and their connection with the concept of popular sovereignty. The author states that the constitutional conventions require a high degree of legitimacy in order to make institutional changes possible, and thereof constitute as a tool that can transform the institutional capacities of the State. On this regard, he defends the conception of democracy and argues that it is crucial to promote debate and impartiality, and to achieve decisions that will affect everyone’s interest. He starts by highlighting the importance of social struggles and its impact in constitutional reforms, arguing that they have a high potential of transforming particular social structures and entrenched injustices. He explains then the debate about mixing different constitutional visions by the importation-reception of institutions and jurisprudence from other countries, as well as the inherent value of these types of operations. Finally, he addresses the topic of pluralism and how constitutions should accommodate the claims of different groups and individuals; for this purpose he provides some detail about the historical responses considered by constitutionalism such as: synthesis, accumulation, inaction and imposition.

References

Ackerman, Bruce. 1991. We the People. Foundation, I. Cambridge: Belknap Press

Carrión, Benjamín. 1959. El santo del patíbulo. Quito: FCE

Elster, Jon. 2014. The Political Psychology of Constitution-Making. Princeton, inédito.

Gargarella, Roberto. 2014. Latin American Constitutionalism, 1810-2010. Oxford: Oxford University Press. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199937967.001.0001

Rawls, John. 1991. Political Liberalism. New York: Columbia University Press.

Sunstein, Cass. 1999. One Case at a Time. Judicial Minimalism on the Supreme Court. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Tushnet, Mark. 1999. Taking the Constitution away from the Courts. Princeton: Princeton University Press. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1515/9781400822973

Waldron, Jeremy. 1999. Law and Disagreement. Oxford: Oxford University Press. DOI: https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198262138.001.0001

Published

2023-10-29

How to Cite

Gargarella, R. (2023). Popular Sovereignty and Constitutional Conventions. Cálamo, Journal of Legal Studies, (3), 6–15. https://doi.org/10.61243/calamo.3.297