Popular Sovereignty and Constitutional Conventions
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.61243/calamo.3.297Keywords:
Constitutional Conventions, Pluralism, Sovereignty, Democracy, ReformAbstract
This article provides an insight about the constitutional conventions and their connection with the concept of popular sovereignty. The author states that the constitutional conventions require a high degree of legitimacy in order to make institutional changes possible, and thereof constitute as a tool that can transform the institutional capacities of the State. On this regard, he defends the conception of democracy and argues that it is crucial to promote debate and impartiality, and to achieve decisions that will affect everyone’s interest. He starts by highlighting the importance of social struggles and its impact in constitutional reforms, arguing that they have a high potential of transforming particular social structures and entrenched injustices. He explains then the debate about mixing different constitutional visions by the importation-reception of institutions and jurisprudence from other countries, as well as the inherent value of these types of operations. Finally, he addresses the topic of pluralism and how constitutions should accommodate the claims of different groups and individuals; for this purpose he provides some detail about the historical responses considered by constitutionalism such as: synthesis, accumulation, inaction and imposition.
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